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Deep Brazil, Shallow Ceiling 
IBSEN PINHEIRO
“A method of continuity is the only one that (by contrast to the 
revolutionary), can avoid, in the march of human affairs, this 
pathological factor that makes History a perennial and exemplary 
struggle between paralytics and epileptics.”
(Ortega y Gasset)
When discussion, in any circle, turns to the National Congress – or more generally, to politics and the public life – it is impossible to not recall Walter Lipmann who said: when everyone is thinking 
the same, no one is thinking anything. With his authority as a recognized 
liberal and militant journalist, he was not, strictly speaking, constructing 
a sociopolitical thesis but rather recording what he had observed in his 
professional practice. 
Can it be that this is what is happening to us? It is without question the 
effect. One can only think that in Brazilian political representation is going 
through a profound crisis, that this crisis is of a moral nature and, besides, 
that is an aspect of the superstructure which has nothing to do with social or 
institutional foundations that surround and/or condition it. And on the basis of 
the moral superiority of the voters (and critics) over those elected, an unshakeable 
diagnosis has been constructed with the force of absolute law, besides being 
comfortable, to the extent that in this analysis, the problem is, if not others, at 
least it belongs to others.
Can reality be so simple, however, almost bad luck, that it is a kind of 
“accidental choice” on the part of those who vote? If it doesn’t run the risk of 
simplifi cation, that minimum that we need to do is to look to our sides – i.e. the 
world – and beneath, the social and institutional bases (and some of them are 
historical) of our reality of this fi rst decade of the 21st century.
The World
Looking around what we see is that the crisis in prestige of political 
institutions, above all of parliaments, is echoed throughout the world, 
with differences in degree from the almost invariably cited diagnosis of 
Lipmann.  Unless this idea of “accidental choice” has been contagious, 
we need to fi nd another basis for the same phenomenon which affects 
countries with different institutional models. Whether in its  form (republic 
or constitutional monarchy), or  in relation to the system of presidential or 
parliamentarian government, they are all exhausted models, excluding only 
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dictatorships from among these alternatives, which preserve themselves 
until, having rotted, they fall.
I have no basis, from lack of information and even of education – I am 
only in the political arena – to expand on the diagnosis, so that I prefer to defer 
to sociologists and political scientists, but I observe enough to exclude bad luck 
and to conclude that the signs that are here are also there, indicating, for those 
in the know, different ringers with different bells, but all tending to the end (and 
melodically) of a democratic system of government.
Many are already anticipating a new, recurrent, general crisis in 
representative government, not by accident, on the brink of authoritarian 
outbreaks whether in Europe in the 1920s before the burial of the Weimar 
Republic in Nazi trash, whether among us, when the epithet of rotten condemned 
the Old Republic and dragged the fragile constitutionalism of 1934 into the 
maelstrom of the New State.
I prefer to be optimistic and believe that when the outbreak passes, 
that we can be fl exible enough to admit an enlargement of the levels of public 
participation in the decisions of government in these times of the internet, always 
with one eye on the fi sh and the other on the cat, in order to not forget that the 
most powerful antidemocratic conspiracies were only successful when they found 
enthusiastic support of the masses.
The Time
Besides thinking ahead, which is the responsibility of all, we always learn 
by looking backward. An eye witness to some decades, my personal experience 
has been enriched by the personal and historical statements of those who have 
lived through other periods of other Brazilian democratic periods, particularly 
in the milder time of the Second Reign, after the turbulence of the Regency 
(during which direct election of the governors was inaugurated) and before the 
turbulences of the Republic. 
Without disparaging the highly personal contribution of the Dom Pedro 
(the second)  style of governing, with good will, patience and uncontested power 
(even as a moderator), weighing heavily on the elitist character of the election itself, 
whether by a few thousand (less than four thousand) who chose Father Feijó in 
1835, were circular, or parochial elections, and of two or three degrees, which came 
much later, prior to the celebrated Saraiva Code which  offered  a decisive advance 
in the last decade of the imperial regime through the elector’s identifi cation card 
and with judicial control (thanks to the narrator Rui Barbosa), but was unable to 
withstand the criterion for eligibility by census (it would be better to say inherited), 
which reduced the electoral body to less than 2% of the population. 
In fact there was little innovation during this phase of the Republic, to 
the extent that the legal climate and its objectives continued to be intertwined 
so as to maintain representation at the restricted level of the upper class, as may 
be seen in their own disputes between their most notorious adherents, nearly 
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always restricted to the confl icts that, when they transcended parochial questions, 
scarcely touched the interests of the great mass of the excluded (up to our gaucho 
Farroupilha Revolution in Rio Grand do Sul, which its great popular appeal, that 
came a century later!).
From this democratization to the present time, known fi rst-hand by any 
sixty-year old that, only some decades behind the Brazilian elite, more than just 
having representation, were personally present, especially in the Legislature, 
whether it was the aristocracy of the rural South, with its descendants from 
Olinda or the Arcadas that replaced the Empire s´ Coimbra generations, whether 
they were the barons of coffee or industry, or the coffee and milk barons from the 
Old Republic.
It is natural that the education levels were superior, from the refi nement of 
their clothes to the proper use of cutlery, by comparison with the predominant 
political picture of today. Their unfavorable appearance does not compromise 
the content of the representation of course, and actually the contrary has more 
logic: today there is a more legitimate relationship between elector and elected 
following the dizzying democratic depth that has occurred within the last thirty 
years, especially since the reestablishment of democracy. 
I have presented here some sparse argumentation aligned with the most 
common biases to explain the erosion in our institutions more by its effects than 
by the causes, in an attempt to understand what has changed in our perception 
without the content of the representation having necessarily changed in. All this 
is true, but it is not all of it. There is much more, and there are clear signs of 
exhaustion of some mechanisms of representation. This is the situation with the 
Brazilian electoral system for the composition of the legislative houses, especially 
those that depend on a proportional vote.
The Bad Way
In modern times Parliaments, in all of the democratic world, are basically 
constituted from two systems of choice, the majority and the proportional, while 
the analysts and the practitioners, politicians or electors dedicate themselves to 
enumerating the defects or respective fl aws of both, or better said, when they run 
unopposed, in order to confront them with the virtues of each.
It is well known that in a majority vote the elector votes for names, 
generally someone close and known for the local character of the district 
representation, which is good, but, at this stage the elector frequently ignores the 
parties, which is bad. In order to compensate, the proportional vote embodies the 
idea of choice of party, which is positive, but loses the personal relationship, which 
is negative.
Thus the Brazilian system manages to combine the worst of the two 
mechanisms. Here the party is not voted for because the vote for deputies is an 
individual, but also one doesn’t vote for the person because the voter never knows 
who can be elected from an open slate that is beyond his control, even more so 
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when it is subject to proportional coalitions of all kinds, which oblige the voter to 
a truly secret vote: no one, in reality, knows who they are voting for.
In this hybrid combination of the relatively recent return to democracy, 
with its great virtue of increasing participation in the political process, an 
accompanying fl aw becomes ever more visible: the appropriation of the electoral 
process by organized sectors of society, which might be desirable if it were not, as 
occurs, at the cost .... of disorganized sectors!
It is noticeable even in the language: whoever feels entitled to political 
rights, the spokesperson of the representation, frequently speaks“in the name 
of,”as it is customary to say,“of society,” whatever that may mean – because people 
are much more than that, especially because it includes, even passively, those 
without a voice, who have no union, have no NGO, have no pressure in Brasilia 
because they don’t even know where  Brasilia is, who pay all their fees but do not 
know any of their names.
All of this has transformed the Chamber of Deputies into a house of 
minorities. All of them are represented there: from the parties there are 18 or 
19 (if there are not more from yesterday to today), without speaking of the rural 
seats, evangelicals, unionists, fi nancial or regional segments, all with great power 
for pressure and capable, eventually, of signing unanimous agreements in which 
the one who remains absent is the one who is the most interested, i.e. the one 
who pays the bill. In the Plenary and its corridors it is well known that when the 
gallery is full, when it applauds and laughs, the Treasury bleeds and cries.
The example, which I have offered is only a singular one, but since it is 
repeated over time and in various places in public institutions – included among 
them the Executive and the Judiciary –  the conclusion is more drastic, that the 
real Brazil has advanced more than the offi cial Brazil, or perhaps to put it in terms 
of the Brazilian offi cialdom, in a tragic summary: at its heart Brazil, which is 
among the eight principal economies of the world, which increasingly participates 
in the major international subjects, retains within itself a Third World mentality 
that views the rich from two distinct standpoints: tearful protest and embarrassed 
begging. Brazil no longer deserves this role. Brazil in depth doesn’t deserve the 
low ceiling of aged and outmoded political institutions that insist on belittling 
it. For the Country of the Future, the future has arrived. It remains, perhaps, to 
notify it.
It is to this that another quite odd deformity has grown – the Federal 
Union has no representation in the National Congress, where deputies and 
senators represent everything – States, municipals, neighborhoods or professional 
categories but the Union is only represented by a portion – fortunately outspoken 
– of parliamentarians conscious of their essential role in the Federation, and who 
at times risk their own reelection if they are contrary to any local interest in a 
confrontation with the general interest.
The evidence for this deformity is the diffi culty of fi nding relevant and 
uniform treatment for serious national questions. An example is the Amazon. 
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Frequently predominant in discussions – and decisions – are the corporate and 
local issues, of the environment or of indigenous people, of the rice farmers or 
loggers, to the point that prevailing in offi cial circles is an outsider vision for 
the preservation of the forest, as if we want to make it into a botanical garden 
for the delight of centralized powers. And for the indigenous people, a model 
of isolationism more in line with the idea of a zoo than with true human 
development.
In order to overcome the paralysis that results from pulverizing the 
national political will by corporate appropriation, a mechanism of consensus is 
built which works perfectly as long as the theme is irrelevant. Or generically, 
as with sustainable development, which unifi es all of us, since there is no need 
to demonstrate which kind of development and what type of sustainability 
complying, therefore, to the lesson of Thomas Aquinas: as to principles we have 
no divergence; the diffi culty begins when we need to defi ne the process.
In this Legislature I took part in two efforts to change the institutional 
framework, in 2007 and again, recently, in 2009, in both attempts with the 
ostensible support of the government and the major parties – PMDB, PT, PSDB 
and DEM –, which should be suffi cient and decisive for the approval of signifi cant 
reform. Nothing dramatic, but the party vote and public fi nancing, by the 
overextended predominance of the minorities, the trap described was deactivated.
The failure of these largely majority efforts, which occurred without the 
matter being brought to a vote, was confi rmation that the result was symptomatic 
of the problem itself. The appropriation of the decision making process by 
crushing and effective aggressive action of minority interests magnifi ed by its own 
deformities which are self-generating and self-sustaining to such an extent that 
they hold majorities and presidents hostage, to the point of leaving one last hope 
for optimism: that democracy, in order to not kill itself, must change the model. I 
hope before the next institutional crisis. In its place.
Dangerous House
I am not unaware that I am defending the institution to which I belong 
(if I were a victim it would be, in the same sense, more of a victim than I). I also 
have not the slightest obligation to defend the deviations of conduct that are 
practiced there, individually or collectively, to the point that it is unnecessary to 
invent negative facts for the headlines, but, for all that I have written here, it is 
obvious that I identify the deformities on the institutional level much more than 
the personal, and lean much more toward the legal and political structures than 
to the voter’s poor fi nger.
History allows me this evaluation. The Legislature, in Brazil, especially 
in the Chamber of Deputies, is a dangerous institution for established interests, 
especially those that time has supplanted, that are afraid for their survival.  It was 
there, in its Plenary, from the Jail House or Tiradentes Palace in Rio, or more 
recently in the time denominated the Plenary of Ulysses
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Guimarães, that crucial decisions were adopted for Brazil in the formation 
of its national unity and social advances. 
It was there that the Aurea Law was written to prohibit the slave trade;  
where the Abdication crisis of 1831 and the“Majority”crisis of 1840 took place, 
the fi rst from nationalizing power and the second to liberalize the government, 
without  elaborating on the campaigns for the Republic or, most important of 
all, “Diretas Já”. As though it were there that it died, slain by death, was our last 
dictatorship, confronting the idea that the place for transformation was not by 
judicial agreement but from a plenary plurality, tumultuously, not always elegant 
but invariably tied to the people as any other institution among us, demonstrating 
the best lesson of the greatest of legislators, Solon of Athens: “A State that 
endures is that in which the people obey the rulers and the rulers the law.” 
As a good student Cicero, a man of the law, understood: “Athens owes 
more to Solon for the laws that he gave it, than to Themistocles for the victory of 
Salamis, because that was useful once, and the laws, forever.”
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